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INTRODUCTION
Roger E. Levien, Director
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
In 1976 the U.S. National Academy of Sciences received a contribution
to be used for
...the furthering of research, in an international setting, and addressed
to the methods and concepts of systems analysis broadly conceived....
...to support research, or the presentation and discussion of research,
bearing on problems of an interdisciplinary, international and world-
wide character, both with regard to the individuals participating in
the research or its discussion, and to the problems of world society
to which the findings are hoped to be applicable.
The National Academy of Sciences felt that an activity benefiting the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (nASA) would be
consistent with the intentions of the gift.
After consideration, the Institute proposed that the gift to the
Academy be used to sponsor an nASA Distinguished Lectureship, which
would be an annual event intended to "further research in the methods
and concepts of systems analysis broadly conceived" and to strengthen
nASA's role as a forum for presentation, exchange, and discussion of such
research, with an emphasis on the international and interdisciplinary
character of systems analysis.
The Academy accepted this proposal, and planning was initiated to
select an appropriate speaker to initiate the Lectureship. Deliberations
among the research staff and leadership led to the choice of Professor
George Dantzig. In retrospect, the selection seems to have been inevitable,
for Professor Dantzig's work exemplifies the ideal of methodological
advancement combined with applicability toward which nASA strives.
2Professor Dantzig is perhaps best known as the inventor in 1947 of
the simplex method of solving linear programs, which in conjunction with
the high-speed digital computer has made possible the solution of complex
optimization and planning problems in fields as diverse as petroleum refining
and manpower planning, farm management and machine scheduling, water
resources planning, and transport system operations. Furthermore, as
the brief biography at the back of this book attests, he has contributed
significantly over the past three decades to the further development of
mathematical programming, which has proven to be a methodology of
fundamental importance to applied systems analysis throughout the world.
Professor Dantzig has at the same time always been deeply engaged
in the application of mathematics to practical problems. Beginning with
the work during World War II on the scheduling of large enterprises, his
career has spanned such problem areas as petroleum and gas distribution,
milk production and distribution, medical diagnosis, chemical equilibrium
analysis, and ecology. Today his efforts are devoted to energy policy
planning.
There is another, more personal, reason that we felt George Dantzig
was the best person to initiate IIASA's Distinguished Lectureship: he began
nASA's work on methodology. During the first months of the Institute's
scientific activity in 1973 and 1974, Professor Dantzig established the
Methodology Project and, with it, the tradition, which continues today, of
a close collaboration between the methodologists and those working on
applied problems. The standards of excellence that he brought to the
Institute have remained as guides to the work of what has become our
System and Decision Sciences Area. And his personal warmth and willing-
ness to help have served as a model for subsequent leaders.
It is thus particularly fitting that the first nASA Distinguished Lecture
has been presented by Professor George Dantzig, recipient of the U.S.
National Medal of Science, member of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, and nASA alumnus.
THE ROLE OF MODELS IN DETERMINING
POLICY FOR TRANSITION TO A MORE
RESILIENT TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY
George B. Dantzig
THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL
Harrison Brown, in his new book, Learning How To Live in a Technological
Society, says
Historians of the future may well look back upon the thirty-five
year interval between 1973 and 2008 as the most critical of human
history. We must face the fact that we are well into a period in which
enormous world forces are converging rapidly and threatening to
engulf us all. Indeed those forces may well destroy, perhaps forever,
our ability to create a world community in which all people have the
opportunity of leading free, abundant and even creative lives, divorced
from the traditional scourges of hunger, deprivation and war.
Why does Brown select 1973 as the starting point? "Because that
marks the year when a major critical resource, crude oil, was first used
... as a major weapon of war." The convergent forces he speaks of are
rapid growth of population and affluence; increasing demands for food,
energy, and raw materials; decreasing quality of the resource base; changing
environment, including climate; rapid technological change; the growing
gap between the rich and poor nations; the increasing danger of nuclear
war that hangs over all humanity; the rivalry of the superpowers; and the
This paper was prepared while the author was on sabbatical leave from Stanford University; he was
with the Institute for Advanced Study of Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, from January
to June 1979 and the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria, in
June and July 1979.
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4increasing vulnerability of complex industrial societies to disruption by a
combination of internal and external pressures.
Modern technological societies are confronted by this vast array of
problems. They are interlocked, one with another, forming a vast web.
The solution to anyone problem will not necessarily ease the functioning
of the whole - indeed, it can often make things worse. This is true because
the modern technological world is incredibly complex, interconnected,
and interdependent.
WHAT IS MEANT BY THE STATEMENT:
"MODERN TECHNOLOGY IS COMPLEX"?
It is not easy to paint a picture of just how complex modern technology is.
One way to start is to list the activities of a small town. By using the
classified section of the telephone directory, I can list a few activities of
the town of Richmond, California. Here are those that begin with the
lettersBr: Bridge Builders, Bridge Tables, Broadcasting Stations, Brochures,
Brokers, Bronze, Brushes, Brooches, Brakes, Brandies, Brazing, Bricks,
Brick Stain, Bric-a-Brac. I counted over 6,000 activities in all.
Another way to see the diversity of the material side of life is to
look at a catalog of electronic supply items that are for sale. There are
thousands upon thousands of different kinds of resistors, condensors,
vacuum tubes, transistors, cables, sockets, knobs, switches, dials, circuit
boards, cabinets. Look up the number of different items listed in a chemi-
cal supply catalog or a Sears, Roebuck catalog, and again the number of
different items runs into many thousands. A modern university can have
a hundred different departments. The United States Government has
nearly 2,000 different kinds of offices in San Francisco alone, each
presumably carrying out a different function for the public good. So far
we have spoken only of diversity, but complexity has other dimensions.
The Leontief input-output model of the national economy of the
United States classifies industries into about 400 major types and requires
data for each of these industries about how much it shipped (or received)
from every other industry. The resulting 400 x 400 table contains 160,000
numbers. Each region of the country has such an input-output table, and
there are many regions. Each number in an input-output table expresses
a dependency of one industry upon another; the transactions between
regions and industries represent further dependencies; there are a great
number of cross combinations. Countries depend on each other in the
same way.
5There are also time dependencies: facilities are built and maintained
for future use; material is stockpiled for future use; people are trained for
future jobs. There are locational dependencies as well: men, material, and
facilities are moved to new locations, not only on the surface of the globe
but below and above.
While we may easily understand the ins and outs of each small part of
this vast web of activities, the problem is how to track all the interactions
at once. We know that the powerful forces of population growth, short-
ages of raw materials, food, energy, growing affluence, and so on, are
rapidly reshaping this complexity. There is a fear, based on reasons that I
will deal with below, that the structure that interconnects these activities
may not hold up very well under these stresses. We see the possibility of
all kinds of system failures if we let the changes go on uncontrolled. Is
there some way to come to grips with this complexity, to steer and reshape
it into a more resilient, less interdependent economic system?
The greatest hope, in my opinion, for coming to grips with the
dynamics of change in our complex technological society in these critical
years ahead, lies in the use of mathematical models and computers. This
use of models is not the solution, but without them, there may be no good
way to plan a smooth transition.
WHAT ARE MODELS?
The term "models" requires some definition. In its crudest form, a
"model" of a system, whether it be a biological system or an economy, is
viewed as a black box whose inner workings are a mystery; it is possible,
however, to observe the various inputs into it or outputs from it. One
describes the system mathematically by a system of differential equations
or finite difference equations, usually linear. One adjusts the unknown
coefficients of the models and other parameters (such as time delays) so
that a good fit to the historically observed inputs and outputs is obtained.
I call models of this sort models of ignorance because they assume
that nothing is known about the inner workings of the system. Even
though such knowledge exists, it is sometimes convenient to act as if one
didn't have it: I recently heard a talk about an automobile engine being
modeled in this way. These crude models of ignorance have been remark-
ably successful in practice; indeed, much of control theory uses this
approach.
Econometric models are more sophisticated versions of this type of
model. The differential equations are no longer linear but are nonlinear
6functional forms whose solutions make more sense over a wider range of
inputs. Such models should perform better than models of total ignorance,
but there are those who would question whether they do.
Another class of models makes use of simultaneous equations. The
Leontief input-output matrix is a good example of this sort. The econ-
omy is represented (as noted earlier) by about 400 industries that produce
400 different types of goods. Each industry is represented by a column of
the matrix; this column is the vector of inputs required to produce one
unit of output. Given the levels of production of various industries, one
can multiply these by the input-output matrix to compute the net output
of goods available to the consumer sector. Conversely, given the net out-
put of industry, one can multiply it by the inverse of the input-output
matrix to compute the production levels necessary to produce this output
in the real world.
I should like now to turn to a third type of model. These are alter-
native processes. For example, in the energy sector, there are a number of
different ways to produce electricity. The third class of model, the linear
program, allows for such alternatives. As in the Leontief model, the
columns of the matrix of coefficients represent the inputs and outputs of
various goods associated with a unit level of an activity (a process). There
are now more columns than rows because alternative processes are allowed.
As in the real world, there is now freedom to do things in different ways,
and it is necessary to use objective functions to select among the alter-
natives.
The dynamics of growth in a finite world have been studied by
Forrester and Meadows using models of the finite difference equation
type. Other global models use a mixture of approaches and vary greatly
in level of detail. (Global models have attracted great attention and con-
cern because of their prophecies of worldwide shortages of food and
energy.)
The Leontief and linear programming models are often called "bottom-
up" because they attempt to build a representation of the system from
known (or hypothesized) workings of its various detailed component parts.
For example, a refinery is represented as a collection of chemical processes
in various tanks and pipes that transform the outputs of one process into
the inputs of another. Each process has a known mathematical description,
and the power of the model is that it is able to simulate the complexity of
the system as a whole by keeping track of the transformations going on
within a part and by accounting for the flow between parts.
There are two ways in which models are used:
71. To simulate an existing system and to predict how it will change
over time.
2. To model a variety of possible future systems with the idea of
selecting a future that is more attractive than the others according
to some specified criterion and then to spell out broad policies that
appear necessary to bring this future about. (Actually, models
of this type can do much more. It is possible to find a solution
that is "best," i.e., one that maximizes the criterion function.)
A policy may be simply a statement: "We should build two central solar
power stations in Arizona by the year 1990." Usually, we use the term
more broadly, to mean a consistent policy - a program of actions that are
consistent with one another and mutually self-supporting.
Both kinds of models work with very aggregated representations of
reality. The state of the nation or of the world is boiled down to a few
hundred numbers. The number of relations between various activities
is boiled down to a few thousand. As a result policies are also expressed
in very aggregated terms. Even so, policy makers often complain that the
answers provided by the models are too detailed. Unfortunately, the
nature of complexity is that it is complex. Because politicians and the
public demand simple answers to complex issues, the search goes on to
find ways of expressing policies in simple terms. Recently, my group at
Stanford has been asked by the U.S. Department of Energy to work on a
project originated by James Schlesinger, the U.S. Secretary of Energy,
called "Model Simplification." Our approach is to set up a hierarchy of
submodels, each of which supplies summary-type information to the next
higher echelon.
Before discussing the use of models, let us return to the subject of
why models are needed.
MODERN TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETIES ARE FRAGILE
Industrial society is a complex interconnected system composed of mines,
factories, farms, transportation and communication networks, power grids,
and water and sanitary systems that support our homes, shops, hospitals,
schools, and recreational facilities. The failure of any major component
can jeopardize the life of the whole, much as can a failure of a single
critical organ of the human body.
Industrial society is like a busy highway - the slightest disruption
8can cause a monumental traffic jam. One accidental overload of an electric
power grid can cause the blackout for days of a whole section of the United
States. The fat belly of an operator of a control panel of a nuclear power
station can obscure the instruments warning of danger, causing a meltdown
of the nuclear core and the scrapping of a billion-dollar reactor. The recent
short supply (or rumored short supply) of gasoline in California caused
millions of motorists to queue in their cars for hours, disrupting work and
damaging the tourist industry. On a still larger scale, economies may go
into recession or into boom; inflation can go out of control. Systems have
become so complex that they are no longer understood in all their intri-
cacies.
A kind of mystique has grown up about systems. In recent times a
number of books have appeared about the "mysterious ways" in which
large-scale systems behave; these systems appear to take on a life of their
own. The books are humorous, silly, often no more than a collection of
cliches. Most people do not take the ideas expressed very seriously, but
the system failures that they describe are all too familiar.
John Gall, in his remarkable little book, General Systemantics,
pronounced "system antics," describes the ways of systems:
Things Aren't Working Very Well
Systems In General Work Poorly Or Not At All
If Anything Can Go Wrong It Will
New Systems Mean New Problems
Large Systems Usually Work In Failure Mode (If At All)
A Large System, Produced By Expanding The Dimensions Of A
Smaller System, Does Not Behave Like The Smaller System
When A Fail-Safe System Fails, It Fails By Failing To Fail Safe.
(He likes to capitalize the first letter of words.)
Gall captures the essential difficulty of dealing with complex systems
with the following alliterative (possibly) fictitious example:
Insecticides, introduced to control disease and improve crop yields,
turn up in the fat pads of Auks in the Antipodes and in the eggs of
Ospreys in the Orkneys resulting in incalculable ecologic damage.
9MAKING SYSTEMS LESS FRAGILE
Gall offers only one piece of advice: Don't make systems too tight. Tight-
ness is the result of trying to make systems efficient. Don't! Build in
redundancy instead. Have many different ways to do the same thing.
Systems that are not tight last longer and function better.
Modern technological societies are too fragile - they are designed too
tight. Many critical industries and services are now so highly automated
and computerized that only a few persons are needed to operate them.
They are, for this reason, highly vulnerable to sabotage, strikes, accidental
happenings - vulnerable because highly trained operators become bored
and are replaced by less well trained operators, who are unable to cope
with a real emergency; vulnerable because no one is really in charge; to be
more precise, vulnerable because, in fact, bureaucratic regulations are in
charge, with only "good soldier Schweik" at the controls, following orders
designed to cover the worst case.
We can learn much by studying other complex systems, such as earlier
societies or biological systems, that have successfully survived for long
periods. Here are some observations about how resilience can be increased:
1. By not placing the system under too severe a strain. Don't
operate a system near its capacity.
2. By building redundancies into the system so that when one part
is strained, alternative pathways are available that will permit the
strain to be relieved.
3. By being prepared to accept risk in order to reap benefit. This
could greatly simplify the complexity of parts of the system.
The demand of industrial societies for energy is increasing rapidly. This
has greatly increased the strains on almost all the economies of the world.
In order to lessen the vulnerability that results, three approaches are being
pursued by industrial societies:
1. Lessen the needs for energy.
2. Make greater use of domestic resources.
3. Diversify external sources of imported energy.
Major Changes Are ReqUired to Make our Society Less Fragile
Becoming resilient requires extensive changes in the ways we do things.
Self-sufficiency in energy requires using energy sources ranging from trees
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to uranium ore; it involves the use of sun rays to heat homes; coal and
shale and alcohol to generate liquid fuels to run our cars; windmills and
geothermal power to light our lights. There is an urgent need to redesign
our cities so that they are less vulnerable to electric power outages and to
transportation failures; so that they are more convenient, with fewer
automobile accidents; and so that green space is conserved.
The coordination necessary to bring about the smooth transition to a
more resilient industrial base and urban design is extensive and would have
to proceed on a broad front. It is made all the more difficult by various
groups who may be opposed to change because they feel that their vital
interests will suffer. Indeed this resistance to any proposed changes may
be the most difficult stumbling block of all. Only through developing
consistent programs of action that clearly demonstrate that the proposed
actions are to the advantage of society as a whole can we hope to find
ways to convince these diverse groups to cooperate for the common
good.
HOW THE PILOT ENERGY/ECONOMIC MODEL
CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE POLICY
In order to determine what changes are necessary - i.e., to arrive at a
consensus on what actions should be carried out - models can play an
essential role. I should like now to illustrate the kinds of consistent plans
that can be developed by using the PILOT Energy/Economic Model,
which I helped build at the Systems Optimization Laboratory, Operations
Research Department, Stanford University. Our research at Stanford is an
outgrowth of my contacts with Wolf Hafele and his Energy Project at
IIASA. (During the early days of IIASA, 1973-1974, I served as leader of
the Methodology Project.)
PILOT addresses the following problem:
Currently, two-thirds of U.S. energy comes from domestic gas and
oil. In the next 40 years only one-third can come from this source.
Query: How do we effect a smooth transition to new energy sources?
The main linkages of the PILOT model are shown in Figure 1. The
"industry" box is a Leontief input-output model of the economy - this
part describes the inputs into each industry from other industries in order
to produce a product. The "detailed energy" box describes a large variety
of processes (nuclear, solar, oil, gas, coal, and so on) that convert raw
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source energy into more usable forms. The model is dynamic. Reserves
of oil and gas are kept track of over time. Exploration for new oil and gas
enlarges these reserves; oil consumption reduces them. The capacity
of industrial facilities is expanded as required over time by drawing on
products in competition with the products used by the final consumer.
Consumers, in turn, provide industry with a workforce. To acquire foreign
oil, industry must produce products for export. The relations dealing with
the balance of payments between nations are represented by the "rest of
the world" box.
PILOT belongs to the second class of models described earlier. It
lays out a possible future for the United States. It is a linear programming
model consisting of 800 linear equations in 2,000 non-negative variables
representing the levels of activity of various processes over the next 40 to
100 years. The objective of the model is to maximize the future standard
of living of the population. Figure 2 shows one of many pages of output
of the model: the sources of energy that should be developed.
Figure 3, drawn from another study using the PILOT system, shows
dramatically that major changes are required in the way we heat our
homes.
The objective to be maximized in the PILOT model, as mentioned
above, is a function that represents the "standard of living." This is defined
as the discounted sum (over the period of the study) of the Gross National
Consumption. Figure 4 shows that the availability of primary energy can
make a big difference in the average income level. By 2005 the average
income could be $6,000 (in 1967 dollars) per person if there is abundant
primary energy available; it would be only 65 percent of this if primary
energy is in short supply.
The PILOT EnergyjEconomic Model is one of many models currently
being used by the Department of Energy of the United States and by the
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to study the long-range aspects
of the energy transition problem. It is also one of many that have been
used by the Energy Modeling Forum to study various energy issues. I
should like to say a few words about this forum.
THE ROLE OF THE ENERGY MODELING FORUM
IN DETERMINING POLICY
The Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) (with headquarters at Stanford
University) supported by EPRI and other groups, is an important new way
to bring policy makers and model makers together. The modus operandi
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of EMF is first to select an issue related to energy; next to get agreement
on source data, basic assumptions, and scenarios; finally, different groups
that have developed models (using different methods) are invited to run
their models in competition with each other. The results are compared.
As many as eight models can compete. Differences in results can be very
instructive. The Forum has done much to build up confidence in energy/
economic models and to learn about their strengths and weaknesses. These
exercises have helped to bring about a consensus among academics, indus-
trialists, and government officials about what the nature of the transition
to new energy sources is and what form it is likely to take or should take.
THE USE OF SCENARIOS TO TEST THE
RESILIENCE OF THE SOLUTION
Typically, energy models are run under a variety of scenario assumptions to
take into account the effects of conservation and the uncertainties about
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the availability of new technologies, foreign energy imports, domestic re-
serves, and so on. Some attempt is made in this process to arrive at a future
energy technology profile that will be able to supply energy even when
various unplanned and unhappy events (as represented by scenario cases)
occur. Nevertheless, much work needs to be done to arrive at solutions
that, if implemented, would yield the kind of resilient industrial structure
that Harrison Brown believes is necessary if modern society is to survive.
EDUCATING POLICY MAKERS TO USE MODELS
The problem of the growing disparity between rich and poor nations, the
problem of changing the nature of our industries so that they will be less
vulnerable, the problem of transition to new technologies as traditional
sources of resource supply disappear, the problem of changing and re-
working the design of our cities, all can benefit from the advanced use of
models since such use can result in balanced and consistent plans of action.
We live in rapidly changing times, and the time has come to demonstrate
to policy makers and politicians that their respective countries - and the
world - can no longer allow them to make policy about complex systems
(such as the economy or the environment) without the use of such models.
The Energy Modeling Forum and the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis are part of this educational process.
Much work needs to be done, however, to educate policy makers,
as can be seen from a recent survey of key personnel in Washington, D.C.,
involved in policy making. The following is a paraphrase of some of the
answers received about their opinions of modeling and analysis:
"A good Assistant Secretary knows when to use a number. He knows
when a number is good and knows where and to whom to go to get a
good number."
"Staff people (of a senator) are not influenced by models, except if
they conform to a point of view that they wish to promote."
"Senators are advocates. Few if any of them know anything about
the technical details modeling folk talk about. They don't talk the
same language."
"PIES (the main planning model of the Department of Energy) is
irrelevant to anything we do around here. No one and I mean no
one, takes it or any other model seriously."
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"At best, a senator has a 6-year time frame, but we are asked to look
at analysis with a 25-year horizon, or more. That is ridiculous."
"We need discrete and simple answers, and no model is going to give
you that."
"The only influence of impact that modeling has is on the incomes
of the modelers."
The situation with regard to use of models for policy analysis, however, is
not as gloomy as these answers seem to indicate.
For example, John Weyant in a 1979 EMF study, "Quantitative
Models in Energy Policy," has made an analysis of two important energy
policy debates before the 94th Congress. In his paper, the extensive use
of models in these instances is documented and analyzed to identify con-
ditions that seem to have led to the success or failure of modeling tools.
Another survey, this time of federally funded modeling projects, concluded
that no more than one-third of the models developed achieved their avowed
purpose of direct application to policy problems. I regard a score of one-
third as very good indeed!
Another example. In 1978 the State of Texas took steps to acquire
from the U.S. Department of Energy the PIES model with the purpose of
making their own analysis of what U.S. energy policy should be. This is
the first instance I know of in which two rival political groups have been
using models to advance their own positions. In my opinion, this may be
the most important single event in the effort to bring about the acceptance
of models as the principal tool for analyzing complex issues.
SUMMARY
As Harrison Brown has said, the period 1973 to 2008 is a critical one for
modern, technically oriented societies. He believes that our present society
is structured too tightly and is fragile and vulnerable to world forces of
growing population, diminishing resources, rising affluence, differences
between rich and poor nations, accidents, strikes, sabotage, and so on.
Our society may not survive unless it undergoes, with all deliberate speed,
changes that will make it less fragile, less vulnerable.
The world, and in particular each country, should act now. IlASA
could take responsibility for the global aspects. Because of the complexity
of the economic, environmental, and political systems, I doubt that a
smooth transition can be effected without the extensive use of models to
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represent this complexity in order to develop consistent programs of
action - that is, to develop policies that, if implemented, could lead to a
more resilient, less vulnerable economic system with a greater promise of
the good life for all.
The methodology for using models and computers for formulation of
policy exists and has been tested. Their use by policy makers so far has
been very limited (at least in the United States). If we accept the thesis
that the danger of collapse of our society is very real because our tech-
nology is designed too tight, then I feel that it is important that models
assume a key role in developing plans for moving smoothly to a more
resilient technological society.
Time may be running short.
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